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Potential Benefits of 
Rights-Based Management 
in the Reef Fish Fishery 
Qui1111 \'(leninger and.fames R. ~Vater:s 
Controlled :Jcce:-.s fisheries management consisting of vessel ent•y restric-
tions, a total allowable catch CI"AC> policy that is enforced with periodic tlsh-
t:l) do-;ures, and per-trip-catch limits for qualifying ve:-.sels has failed to 
alhie,·e management objecti\·es in the no rthern Gulf of 1\Jexico commercial 
reef fish fishety. ll1e alional ~Iarine Fisheries, ervice ( r-,jM FS> has classified 
<;t:\eral reef fish spedes, including the highest-valued .<;pecies in the northern 
reef fish complex-red snapper-as overfished ( MFS 2002). The economic 
benefi ts generated by the reef fish fishe1y have declined considerably under 
the controlled access regime. Pcri<x.lic Fishel)' closures have led to a race for 
!Ish with market gluts and depr<::ssed dockside prices. Th<:: r:\Ce fo r fish cre-
ate., harvesting ineflkienly, which ra ises fishing costs and reduces the value 
o f the reef fish resource. In addition, the race for fish lures vessds to sea in 
hazardous weather and has been cited as the ca use of a recent vessel sink-
ing in the fishery.1 
J\t.Jnager; and industl)' partidpants agree that the reef tlsh thhe1y is in need 
of management reform; however, a consensus has not been reached as to 
which managem<::nt alternative is best. O ne rromising alternative is a tradable 
harvest permit program. nder tradable ha1vest permits, or property 
rights-ba.,ed (RI3) management, th<:: manag<::r controls the aggregate catch by 
allocating exclusive lights to harv<::M specified quantiti<::s of reef fish. Tradable 
permih provide incentives to harvest reef tlsh more efficiently. IL is well 
kno\Vn that such programs can alleviate the mce for fish and improve eco-
nomic conditions. But managers and induslly contemplat ing them must do so 
without knowing the extent ot the economic hcnetlts that may be generat<:d. 
l'<~entLII managemenl implication.' in lhi' dupter tk> not n.:fle<t the man,1genw111 phil<>-<>ph} 
or th~· ~.llimul i\1,1rine Fi., llt'rie' Sen in:. 
70 Quinn \flenln;ter und}ames R. W~ten; 
An ex aute estimate of the potential benefits thus prO\'ide~ vital info rmation 
that will undoubtedly assi~t in the management reform process. 
The benefit from swit<.:hing to HB management can be measured as lhe net 
n.:venues- total n.:venues minus to tal hatvesting cosl.s-generated in lhe 
tlshety under the RB regime minus the net revenues under controlled acces~ 
management. An estimate of fishety net revenues under RB management 
prior to its implementation requires a prediction of the harvesting and mar-
keting practices that are expecled 1.0 prevail in the fishety ex post. This is par-
ticularly challenging because the hatvesting and marketing practice~ are ex-
pected to change, possibly dramati<.:ally, under the RB operating rules. Jr is 
essential that ex posl behavio ral changes he understood and incorporat<.:d 
into the ex ante benefit eslimal.e. Failure to incorporate the~e change:-, into 
the as:-,essment of the bend'iL'i o f HB programs can unden:sti m::tle the ga in:-, 
from management refo rm. For example, an impottant ad \'antage of RB pro-
gr • .llns is that they provide incentives to reduce overcapit alized fishing tleets. 
An e:-,limate of the henetlts of adopling an RB program 1.hat doe:-, not include 
economies from tleet downsizing w ill underestimate the economic benefits 
of RB management and may lead managers and indusuy to adhere to the sta-
tu:-, quo management approach. 
This chapler repotts from a recent study of the nonhern Gulf of Mexico 
reef fish fishety hy the authors, hereafH.:r referred to as the WW study. that 
provides ex culle estimates of 1.he heneiiL-; o f switching to a HB management 
program in the fishety.l Also discussed are lhe causes of economic wa:-,te un-
der the controlled acces:-, management program, delails of the empirica l 
methodology, and fLuther re.~ull.s. Experience with other fisheries that have 
adopted such programs, discussions w ith indusLiy and managers, and most 
impottant, careful allention to t.he economic incentives th:ll are implicit in 
tradable hatvest permit programs are used to characterize hatvesting and 
marketing practices thai. are expected und<.:r HB management in the fishety. 
Of course, it is possibk thai. new marketing and hatv<.:sting practices w ill 
emerge under RB managl!ment. But new practices w ill he adopted o nly if 
they are more pro fitable than curremly available ones. By estimating the 
benefits under the assumption thai. fishers w ill utilize currently available har-
vest technologies, a lower bound is obtained on the economic gains that are 
available under RB management. 
INDUSTRY BACKGROUND AND REGULATIONS 
The reef fish fhhety in the Gulf of l'vlexico is a complex of bottom-d\\ elling 
species consisting o f red, vermilion, and other snapper species; yello\\'edge, 
gag, warsaw and other species of groupers; amherjacks; triggcrfi~h; porgie~; 
l.ild h h; and a host of others. The component of the reef th h fishety studied 
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in thi., chapter extends through the northern region of the Gulf of Mexico, 
\\l">t of Panama City. flo1ida. to the Texas-Mexico hord<.:r. f\.lanagement prob-
fl:m, in the e.1~tern <.;ull commercial rec.:f thh fishery are ~imilar in character 
to tho-.e in the west; ho\\·t::,·er, specic.:s compositions and gear types diffc.:r. 
Sp;lle limitation.\ do not permit a comprehensive analysis of both regions. 
An ~n-er.:tge ol 167 vc.:ssds pa1ticipated in the nonhern red fish fi~he1y 
!rom 1990 to 2001. A typical commercial reef fi~hing llip in the nonhern Gulf 
of \lexico im ol\'e~ steaming to a M:ll'cted fishing site, w hich may be located 
In exces.o., of LOO miles from pon of departure. A weighted \"CJtical line con-
raining ~(:\"CJal baited hook~ is lowered to the dc~ired depth. Once reef tlsh 
are lured to t.h~: bait and hooked, the line is recO\·ered eith~:r with a hydraulic 
or hand-po'' ered winch. Vessels ohen search multiple .... ites on a single fish-
Ing trip When the vessel ca ptain is sati~fled with the ha1veM quantity, or po.'>-
'ihly when the quantity harvc~ted reaches the per-trip-catch limit under con-
lrolkd acce~s managem~:nt, the vessel steams back to p011 and ~db the 
c..oatth. In the absence of per-trip-catch limits, most trips averag<.: less than 
SC\en <.lay~ \\ ith median trip length equal to three or four days. The prim~uy 
input-. U'>ed to han·c":'>t reef fi~h arc th<.: capital services provided by the v<.:s-
,d. fuel u~ed during steaming and fishing, labo r sen·ices provided by the 
toaptain and crew, bait and ice, and food and supplies to sustain the captain 
and crew during the trip. 
' l11e highe~t-valued red fish species in the northern (;ulf of Mexico reef 
11-.h fishery i~ red ~nappcr, which has hc<.:n th<.: most rcgulat<.:d specie~ in the 
complex. A Gulf of Mexico Reef Fish Fish<.:1y Managem<.:nt Plan (FMP) was 
implemented in Nm·ember 198 1. The FMP enacted a few ~implc harvc~ting 
regulat10m that prohibited fi~hing practices con..,idered to he destructi\'<.: to 
the marine environment. Minimum size restrictions were adopted for com-
mercial and recreational red snapper. Since enactment of the original r~IP, a 
'cries of amendment'> have been adopted, and reporting requircm<.:nts were 
intrcxluced to a~sist ongoing management. The management actions con-
tained in the.sc amendments vary but most take additional measures to re-
duce fishing pre~sure by an increasingly skilled commercial Oed and an ex-
panding for-hir<.: and recreational sector. 
Amendment 1 set an annual TAC fo r red snapper, allocating '5 I percent of it 
to the commercial sector and the remaining 1i9 percent to the recreational sec-
tor. 111e annual comm<.:rcial TAC \\":IS s<.:t at :$.10 million pound~ in 1990, wa.s 
n .. 't.lucL'<.I to 2.01 million pounds during 1991-92, increased to :$.06 million 
poun<h from 1993 to 199), and increased again to lt.65 million pounds from 
l'J.J6 to 2000. Amendment It , adopted in tvlay 1992, impo~ed a tempor::uy 
moratorium on new commercial reef fish enlly permits. This moratorium has 
lx"t:n extended sevemltimcs. The intenl of Amendment 1 was to moder~rte in-
(."ft'.t'l's in fi~hing effo1t and to stabi lize fishing mo1tality, whereas the Gulf of 
Mt·x1co Fishe1y Management Council considered a more comrrehensivc dlo rt 
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limitation program. An etm:rgency ntle, effe<..1ive Oen:mlx:r :$0. 1992, cre<~ tcd 
a rcd snapper endorsement ... ystem that restricted per-uip 'essd catch quanti-
Lies. Reef fish permit ho l<..lers \\ hO could <..lemonstrate a harwst quantity ol at 
least 5,000 pounds of red snapper in r\"\ 0 of the three ycars from 19<X> to 1992 
Wl:re granted an endorst.:ment that entitled the wsscl to catch a max imum of 
2,<XX> pounds of rt.:d snapper per trip. All other qualifk:d \ t.:sscls wen: n.:stricted 
to hal\ t.:st a maximum ot 200 pounds of red snapper per trip. Thc endorse-
ml:nt systl:m \\as in pia ct.: from 199:$ through 1997. In 1998, ,t licen.o;ing systl:m 
was adoptl:d , w hk h gmnt<.:d 1.38 class l licenses to t.:ndorst.:ment penni t hold-
ers and 8 other qualify ing fishers. Class 2 licenses were granted to '559 \e.sscl 
O\\ ncr-operators. Class 1 lin :nses allow a maximum red snapper catch of 2,000 
pounds per trip, and class 2 licenses allow a maximum red snapper catch of 
200 p<>untb of per ttip. 
The red snapper sea.son was open fo r :$65 days in 1990, but after 1990 thh 
ety closures \vere usl:d along with the endorsement system to ensurl: that the 
commercia l red snapper TAC was not exceedl:d. From 1991 through 2000. 
the red snapper season was open for 2:$6, 95, 9'5, 78, 51. 77, 7 1, 72, 70, and 
76 days, n.:spcctively. Fishety closures initiated a race tor l bh, \•.:hich is con-
sidered responsible for llKtny ot the current management problems (Thoma.s 
et al. 199:$; Waters 200 I ). 
Tlw Gulf of Mexico f-ishe•y Management Council proposl'd ,tn RB man-
agement program for the commercial red snapper lh hety, to begin in 1996. 
But in late 1995 Congres.s prohibited its implcmcntation hy impo.sing a mora-
torium on such program'> in li.S. federally managed tlsheries pending a thor-
ough re\ il:w of their elfects. The morato rium was sct to expire or lx: ex-
tended hy Congress on October 1, 2002. 
ECONOMIC DISTORTIONS UNDER 
CONTROLLED ACCESS MANAGEMENT 
The operating rules u.sed to presen e reef fish st<X'ks under the controlkd :K-
cess management program alter fishing and markcting practices. '' hich in 
turn reduces the economic henetlts from reef fish fishing. Some of the dis-
l011ional effects arc ol)\'ious, whereas others arc subtler. 
Market Gluts and Deprt:ssed Prices 
PL·riodic seasonal closures and thc race for th h cau.se 1 .. 1rge quantitil:s of rcd 
snapper to rcach consume• markets quickly. &cause red snapper is htlued 
highest in fn:sh form, seasonal closure.'> re.sult in marketing gluts and reduccd 
<..lcxk...,ide prices paid to tlshcrs tor their catch. Similar effects have hcen d<K u-
mented in other tlshclies that rely on seasonal closures to regulate th~.: harvest..i 
Potential Benejlts (!/ RiMhls-Based ,lfmwgement 
Higher llnit Costs 
Rl"t'l fish fb hermen were asked an open-ended question of how the fed-
er.JI lishmg regulations of per-trip-catch limi ts and Sl'asonal d o.surl's have 
changt:d their fishing activit ies.' Nine of the fo rty-nine respondents, or 18.3 
~R·t:nt. indicated they take shorter fishing trips and more fishing trips per 
'<..':'!son dul' to per-trip-catch limits. 11ecause a large component of reef fish 
haJTe..,t costs is incurred sle-.Jming from port to thl' fishing ground and back, 
'hortened trips increase the ~r-unit cosL'i o f harvesting reef fish. 
Harvest ing Inefficiencies 
An mdustry source indica tes that medium-sized vessels tth i11y to forty feet 
in len.~th > are capable of transport ing up to '5,000 pounds o f prop<.;rly iced 
fhh '->maller vessels can tr..msp01  between 2.000 and 4,000 pounds, and 
large v e.,st!b can properly ice up to '50,000 pounds of fish.~ ' l11e per-Il ip-catch 
limit re.,tn<:ls red snapper harvest for many n::sscls operating in thl' llshe•y. 
In gL·ncral, a binding constr:linl on the harvest of red snapper w ill cause eco-
nomit. incffkiency as llshenm.:n adjust their outputs and inputs to comply 
\\ ith the effects of the regulation. 
I n addition, '"'hen the red snapper season is closed , otherwise productive 
e.., . ,eJ -.ervi<:es either rt!main idle or are allocated to harvest other reef llsh 
'f>t::liCs. 111e number of trips that a vessel can take during a fishing st:ason is 
to ~me c>..'tent constrained by the time required fo r steaming to tht! grounds, 
,e_.,.,eJ off-loading and replenishment of supplies, ve.ssel maintenance, and a 
re:-.t peri<XI for the captain and crew. Although the total number of trips per 
}car '\\.ill vary due to weather and possibly unfo resel!n maintenance delays, 
the number of trips that a vessel can take pt!r year ty pically ranges between 
40 and 15. \Vith an a\'erage trip length of 3 or tj days plus a 3- o r 1-day rest 
pcricx.J. \ essels are capable of fishing 120 to 13"i days per year. It is d .:ar that 
-e-..t.,onal lengths in the range of '50 to I 00 days resl1ict thl! allocation of tlsh-
ing dtc>rt to red snapper production. 
Other more subtle behavioral responses to controlled acct!ss regulations 
lila} also crc-Jte economic inefficiency. Discussions w ith industry suggest that 
the mce fo r fish under seasonal closures encourages some vessels to increase 
ere\\. .,ize, although this is a mort! recent phenomenon. An additional crew 
memhcr <.:an speed haJYesting operations and eliminate the need to stop tlsh-
ing \\. hile the crew resL'i; an additional crew member enahb, shift work in 
which one crew member sll'eps while others continue t1shing operations. 
llli., prJt:ti<.:e must l)t! assumed privately optimal under the d osurl! po licy hut 
input all<x:ati\·dy ind lk ient in lhl! absence of harvest tim<.! constraints. 
Finally, under the seasonal closure po licy, fishermen holding rt:d snaprer 
cndor~ements regularl y target red snapper exclusivd y during opl!nings, and 
7·1 Q 11 i1111 lr'eniiiJ.wr all(,/ }rune:; R \\a ten. 
OLher ~pede~ exdu~ivdy during red ~napper do~ure~. Indication~ from in-
du~tty participants and th<..: cost survey data ~uggeM that '>Om<.: \'<..:SS<..:b incur 
nontri' ial switching co~ts to harv<..:~t di~similar ~pecies. For in~lance, the co~t 
requir<..:d to ~witch from r<..:d ~napper to king mackerel i~ repotted to a' er:tge 
$585. The sea~onal clo~ure pol icy thus cause~ cost-increasing output adjust-
menb that \\ ould nOL othem i~e occur. 
QUANTIFYING TI IE WASTES UNDER 
CONTROLLED ACCESS MANAGEMENT 
Th<..:re is strong anecdotal <..:vid<..:nce to sugg<..:.'>l that the n:gulatoty environ-
ment und<..:r controlled acn:~~ managem<..:nt has re~uhed in hatve.-,ting prac-
tice~ that are economica lly wa~teful. To quantify the wa~tc under the con-
troll<..:d acce~.-. progmm, the \'I!W ~tudy analyzes data from an extensive co~t 
Mtrvey that ,,·as conducted for the 199:3 reef fb h harn:~t ~ea~on .~> The cost 
~urvey elicited info rmation through per~onal interviews from L96 \essel op 
er:Hors, of \\'hich 99 op<..:rated in the no tthern Gulf of Mexico region. Co~t 
survey data are linked to the NMFS Log Book reporting ~>~lem. <;\ hich main-
tain~ detailed records of trip-l<..:vd harvest, trip length and location, and the 
number of cre\\ members onboard the ves~d. 
The data indic.tt<..: that the ninety-nine sample \-esse!~ operating in the 
nonhern region ot the Gulf of Mexico harve~ted a tolal of 2.69 million 
pound~ of fish in '1 99:$. con~iMing of ninety different ~pedes. Wh<..:rea~ the 
number of ~pecie:-. i~ large, a much ~mailer group of .-.pede~ make up the 
hulk of the total catch. Red ~napper n:pre~ent~ the large~! component , ac-
counting for 17. 1 percent of the to tal harve.-.t. The ten large~! volume ~pecie:-. 
account for 88.7 percent of the ~ample catch. 
i\~~essing the economic perfo rmance of fi~hing ve~sds raist:s seve1~1l 
methodological challenge~. The empirical methodologie~ commonly u~ed to 
ml!asure the economic performance o f firm:-. rely on the a~~umption that an 
e~timate of tully efficient production behavior can he obtained !rom data. 
Thi~ a•Ntmption may he tenuou~ in a th hery that b regulated under con 
trolled acu.:~~ management becaus....: by d....:sign controll....:d access regulations 
reduce the harve~t l!flkiency of ves~els. For example, the harvc.:.-,ting prac-
tice~ of 1993 re<.:f fish ves~els have been intluenced by sea~ona l closure and 
per-trip-catch limit~ for r<.:d ~napper. 
To further illustrate this potential problem, con~id<.:r the impacts o f :-.ea-
sonal closure~ in the 199:3 red fhh data. i\n imponant Gtu~e of indfici<.:ncy 
under controlled acce~~. and thu~ an important ~ource ot han e~t co~t sav-
ing~ expected under HB managem<.:nt , is economie~ of scale. Ikd fi~h ve.-.-
sd-, an: expected to expand production under the tradable harv....:~t permit 
program. An impo rtant que~tion to a~k is ho\\' much scall' indficiency exi~b 
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under controlkd access, or in other words, w hat will he the returns to sca le 
under the RB program? Note that the 199:3 data contain observa tions on ves-
"t'l harn~:.ting activities, i.e., inputs and outputs for a ninety-five-day red 
'ruppcr opening and at mo:.t a 2,000 per-trip-catch limit. These regulations 
arc known to constrain the harvL·st of some of th<.: larger n:d ' lhh 'essels. The 
larger 'essds in the 199:3 thhery may he able to expand output far beyond 
\\hat i.o., obsen·cd under the per-trip-catch limit policy and seasonal closure. 
111e analysis of the inefficiency under controlled access and the estimates of 
the potential han•est len:ls under RB management should control tor the ef-
fL>tls of the controlled access regulations. 
Ba-;ed on the assumption that in 1993 some of the active ves.o.,els were not 
seven.:ly constrained hy per-trip-catch limits, the WW study is able to char-
a<: terizc harvesting inefficiency under controlled access management. ~ The 
re. ... ulto., reveal man} of tl1e expected eff<.:cts discussed above. Fir:.t, a dispro-
portionately large amount of technical inefficiency in the production of n:d 
"nap per is indica ted in the J 99:3 data. This finding is consistent \\'ith anec-
dotal evidence "herein vessels fishing for n:d snapper likely sacrificed har-
\Csting (technical> efficiency fo r harvest sp<::ed in the race for fish. 
X>com.l, th<: results reveal considerable differences in the performance of 
mdi\ rdual ves.o.,els. The \Y./\V/ study reports co:.t-d lkiency measures for each 
\'L~'iel in the 199:3 data. The cost eftkiency measure, Ofy,x, u•), where y is 
output quantity, .'\' is input qu:111tity, and u· is input pric<:, is the ratio of the 
minimum or frontit::r cost" to the actual cost incurred to harvest output quan-
tity y \X:'hen O(I',.Y.II') = 1 the vessel attained the minimum feasible co:.tlevel 
and is deemed cost efficient. Values for 0(1' . .\'.11') less than unity indicate that 
the actual cost exceeds tlx~ minimum cost and thus the ves:o;el is cost ind'li-
cient The cost-efficiency measures are reponed in figure · t.l. 
The cost-efficiency analysis indicates large difl'creno:s across active vt.:s-
..,<:Js, ~md generally poor performance fo r a large number of vessels. Roughly 
30 rx-rcent of th<: 1993 sample attained a cost effici<.::ncy score below 0.'5. The 
interpretation is that the actual harvesting costs incurred by these vessels was 
at letst double (in most cases more than double) the cost that would lx: in-
curred by a fully cost-<:f!kient harvesting operation. The cost-dficiency re-
sults suggest an important source of harvest costs savings under RB man-
aw.:ment; low-cost vessels will purchase han·e:.ting permits from high-cost 
\C.'-N:Is, Glusing total fleet harvest costs to decline. 
'rl1e \V\V study reveal:-; that scale inefficiency is an important ca ust.: o f co:-.t 
indtlcicn<.y in the 1993 reef tlsh data. Moreover, scale inefficiency appears to 
he .o.,ystcmatically related to the expected effects of the contro lled access 
n1an;.1gement program. Of the sev<:nty-one sample vessels analyzed, twenty-
three, or 32. 1 percent , are found to operate in a region of increasing returns 
to x"..tle. These vessels tend to he smaller and take fewer fishing trips in each 
~«:a~m. In contrast, twenty-eight , o r 39.'1 pt.:tn·nt, of the sample vessels, are 
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Figure 4.1. Cost-Efficiency Estima tes fo r 1993 Sample Vessels. 
found lO op~:rJ lt: in a region of dt:creasing return~ to sc:Jie. The.~~: ve~sd~ 
tended to he I:Jrger on aw rage. It ~hould be emr lwsized that the emririca l 
methodo logy u~ed in thl! WW Mudy cannot di.~t i ngu ish between true de-
creasing returns to scale and ostensible decreasing returns that rt:sult from 
the distort ional effects ot )')Cf-trir-catch limits. 
In genera l, the findings surror1 the hy)10thesizetl effects of the cont rolled 
access management po licy. Sr ecies-spe<.:i flc regulations for red snapper re-
duce vl.!ssel rrod uctivity, as desired fo r the management objective of stock 
conservation, but cause techn ical and scale indlk iency, and ultimately in-
flated reef fish harvesting costs. 
EXPECfED ECONOMIC BENEFIT NDER 
RIGIITS.UASED MANAGEMENT 
To\\ hat I.!Xtent are costs exr ected to decl ine under the HB management pro-
gram? To amwer this question, the WW study uses an economic model of 
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lon~·nm profit maximizing harve~ting behavior to predict ha1vesting and 
marketmg practices that are expected under Rll management. The main pre-
dittion'> of the model rely on the economic incentives that are implicit in a 
'Y'lem of trJdahle harv<.:st permits. Very simply, tradable han·e~t pcrmits will 
exdungc hand~ until gains from trade ar<.: exhau~tcd. Two conditions "ill 
re .. ult (l) The marginal han·e~ting cost ~ ill he equal for all output'> and 
across .til ~Kii\'e vessels; and (2) no vessel w ill lx: abl<.: to profitably exit or 
enter the RB fishel)'; in other words, the va lue of active:: vessels under RB 
management, including the value of the tradable:: harvest permit.s, will lx: 
higher in the fishery than out. This condition state~ that the han·e~t tlcet is in 
long nm equilibrium. 
Tradable haiVest permits provide sharp incenti ves to r reducing ha1vesting 
co...,ts Consider first the output mix. lndusuy ~ourccs and information from 
the cost o;urvey suggest that there are diseconomies of scope in the produc-
tion of reef fish and nonreef fish ~pecies, i.e., ~pecie-'> such as king mackerel 
and tuna. The rea~on is that ve~sel~ muM modify their gear to han·est non-
red fbh ~pecie~. Gear modifications are coMiy, and no <.:vidence is found to 
sugge:-.t that ha1vesting red fish and no nred together will in any way reduce 
co.sts. lienee, vessels that remain active under Rl:3 management are expected 
to target reef fish species only. 
Although targeting nonreef fish species is co~tly, there are <.:conomic hen-
dlts from ha1v<.:~Ling a mix of reef fish specie~ such as r<.:d ~napper, vermil-
ion :-.napper, and other reef fish species. Species w ithin the reef fish complex 
cohabit and are ty pically intercepted hy the same gear on tiK· same trip. A 
han c~ting strategy that t :lrget~ a single reef fish ~pecies would im olve di~­
cardmg nontargeted species, e\'en though the co~ts to h:nve~t the nontar-
geted tl~h an:! sunk. Single-species reef fish fishing would forfeit ob\ iou~ 
l'(:onomies of scope. It i~ thus reasonable to condudt: that the output bundle 
under RB management w ill be compo~ed of a mix of red snapper and other 
rt."Cf tlsh ~pedes/' but zero quamity of nonreef fish species. 
Consider next the M:ale of production for a \es.sd operating over :m unre-
:»trictt.'<.l h~uvest ~cason length. Dbcu.ssions with industry and evidence from 
the logbook data indicate that a vessd that is thirty-five feel long is capable 
of .spending roughly 100 days at ~ea in a typical year. Larger ve~sels can Hsh 
in more ~e,·ere weather conditions. A vessel that is forty-five, fifty-five, or 
"ixry fi\e feet in length can spend roughly 110, 120, 130, days at st.':.~, re-
"J1<.:cllvely, in a typical year. 
Reef tJ. ... h vessel own<.:rs incur fixed annual operating costs to secure the 
senin:s of the , ·esse! capital. These costs include ~tate and kderal license 
k"Cs. docking fee:-., office staffing, and equ ipment storage and maintenance 
co ... ts. In addi tion, ve'isels must occasionally unde1take costly hull and engine 
merhauls, and replace damaged o r \\'Orn equipment. The pre~ence of fixed 
annual co.'>L~ implies awrage cost or more precisdy ray aver::tg<.: costs ( RAC) 
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Table 4.1 . Activity levels and Harvest Cost Predicted under RB Management 
Vessel 
Length 
(feel) 
Harvest Quantity /pounds) Harvest Cost for RB Vessels 
35 
45 
55 
65 
Red Snapper 
48,825 
69,053 
92,070 
117,878 
Other Reef Fi~h 
101,343 
143,328 
191 ,104 
244,671 
FC 
$ 9,017 
11 ,535 
14,680 
19,478 
Noll': I Cis .mnudl fi•cd cost; VC is varidUic• cost; RAC is r.1y ,werdge cost. 
vc RAC 
$25,421 $0.309 
35,952 0.304 
47,936 0.301 
61,373 0.303 
for a multi:-.pecies tl:-.hing finn w ill have a U-shape.'1 Hay average harvc::-.t 
costs will auain a minimum w hen the ve:-.:-.d input bundle is allcx:ativdy d -
fkient, and when all available \es:-.el capital service:-. are utilized, i.e., when 
the ve:-.:-.el spend:- the maximal day:- at sea. 
The W\YI :-.tudy employs a procedure to est imate th~.: quanti ty of fish that 
\viii he harve.~ted by ves:-.els under RB management. The predicted per-
n~ssd output consists of a mix of red snapper and other reef fish, and a:-.-
sumes an unrestricted harve:-.l reriod lasting :$65 day:-.. The procedure also 
identifies th~.: total inputs per vessel for vessels of varying lengths, and pre-
dicts the RAC of harve:-.ring reef 11:-.h . The re:-.ults from the analysis are re-
ported in table 1.l. 
Table i.l repo11:-. predicted ha1ve:-.r quantities, ftxed and valiable costs, and 
RAC for a thirry-five-, fony-five-, fifty-five-, and sixty-fi ve-foot \e:-.sel. The re-
suiL'i indicate that a vessel that exploits all :n ·ailahle economic::-. of scale and 
:-.cope in production under the RB management prog•~•m w ill achie\'e R.\C 
between 0.:$01 and $0.:$09 rer pound of reef fish. Remarkably, the 1995 
data indicat~.: that th~.: RAC for th~.: seventy-one sample v~.::-.sel:-. operating un-
d~.:r controlled access in 199:$ was roughly 1.074 per round. Extrapolating 
the per pound cost sa\ ings to the entire 199:$ reef fhh catch indicate:-. that a 
cost savings of $8.078 million was available in 199:$ if the red n .... h 11:-.hel)' 
were managed under an RB program. 
The result:-. in table t.l can lx: used to eMimate the total number of ve:-.~eb 
that will opl.!rale under the RB management policy. This ~.:.~Limate is obtained 
simply by dividing the 1993 total r~.:ef tlsh harve . ..,l , i.e., the red :-.napper and 
other rl.!ef fish ha•ve:-.t, by the individual vessel output level:-. that are n:-
poned in table 1. I , and rounding up to the nearest integer. Canying out thb 
calculation finds that the number of active ve:-.sel.., untie• the RB program "ill 
h~.: 29 if composed of :-.ixty-flve-foot ve:-.scls and 70 if composed of thi•ty-tlve-
foot ,·e:-.:-.els. Recall that :$87 v~.:ssels haJve:-.ted reef fish in 199:$ in th~.: north· 
ern Gulf regions and thus Oeel size under RB management i:-. predicted to 
dramatically decline. 
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REVENUE GAINS UNDER RlGHTS-BASED MANAGEMENT 
:-\ext comider the rotential for red snapper revenue increases resulting from 
elimination of the seasonal closure policy. The red snapper fishery was open 
9'i of a possible 365 days in 1993, resulting in large quantities of red snapper 
reaching consumer m:.ukeL~ in a shorr time, and depressed dockside prices. 
TI1e W\Y/ study uses a regression model to predict the average dockside price 
of rt:d !mapper in 1993. Actual and predicted annual average dockside prict:s 
for red snapper along with 95 percent lower and upper confidence hounds 
appear in figure i.2. 
TI1e figure shows the unavoidable effects of the seasonal d osun.: policy, 
\\hich began in 1991. The average dockside price for red snapper in 1993 
"-ilh season length restlicted to 95 days was $ 1.91 per pound . The predicted 
a\erage dockside price under a season length of 365 days is $2.88, with 95 
[X!rcem lower and upper confidence hounds of $2.65 and $3.11, respec-
11\·ely. The total red smpper catch in 1993 was 3.105 mmion pounds, and 
thus red snapper revenues, absent a seasonal closure, could have been 
9.805 million using the prediction or average dockside price for a 365-day 
sea:-,on. The actual 1993 revenue was $6.598 million, indicating revenue 
gain'> under RB management of $:3.208 million. 
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Figure 4.2. Dockside Price Forecast fo r Gul f of Mexico Red Snapper. Source: Average 
Oor:ksidE' price dala provided by NMfS. 
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DISCUSSION 
The combined cost sa,·ings and revenue gain.'> that are predicted to emerge 
under an RB management program in the northern Gull of Mexico red fish 
fishery are estimated at $11.281 million for 199.:3. The \YI\YI analysis based the 
estimate of harvest cost savings lrom management refo rm on the long-run 
equilibrium fleet structure that is predicted to emerge under the 1m program. 
Although the predilled revenue gains are expected to accnre concurrent with 
the elimination of red snapper season closures, the estimated co.'>t savings'' ill 
not he fully n.:alized until the predicted equilibrium fleet stnJCture emerges. 
'l11e resuiL-. from lhe \YI\V study suggest t.hat roughly .:300 \ essds must exit the 
northern Gu lf of Mexico red fish ~lshery before the full bendlts of HB nun-
agement are realized. Delays in the tran.'>ition to the Rl3 equilibrium could 
take years .md may be sensitive to the method used to initially distribute trad-
able hmvest permits (Weninger and just 1997). During this Lime IKHYesling 
costs w ill remain high. Managers and indu~try m.ty wish lO consider policies 
to shonen the fleet transition period, tor example, a vessd buylxKk program 
could be used to speed the transition to the long-run fleet stnrcture. 
The impact of removing more than .:300 fi '>hing vessels from the nonhern 
Gulf of Mexico reef fish llshery and <.k:ploying them in alternative us~:s in the 
economy raises additional concerns. For example, a likd) destination fo r ex-
iting vessels is the eastern Gulf of Mexico reef lhh fishery. This fishery faces 
similar managl.!ment problems as in th<.' northern Gulf region. En~uring that 
exiting vessel capital does not create fu11her economic distortions presents a 
seriou.s challenge fo r induslly and managers. 
The estimate of the bem:fits of RB management reform docs not include 
changes in the: cost required to administer the RB program. lncrea .... ed moni-
toring costs under HB management may detract from total lx:ndits reported 
here CCopes I 986). Com ersdy, RB management could lo\\'er administration 
costs by avoiding frequent regulatoty adjustments, which are an umvoidahk: 
feature of many controll!.:d access management program:-.. 
Another impo r1 ant concern in occ>an tlsherie.'> is bycatch of nontargeted 
species. l3ycatch moJtality in the reef fish fi'>hery i.'> likely to change under RB 
management. Under contro lled access, n :ssds \\ith red smpper permits 
tend to target red snapper during openings and other species during red 
snappt:r closures (Thomas el al. 199.:3>. lkd snapper caught during a d o.-,ed 
season. o r by nonpennitted \essels, must lx; discarded as hycatch. Although 
no formal estimates of total hycatch mortality for reef fish are av.ribhiL·. dim-
in~lling seasonal dosures \\ill likely reduce the problem. Nonl·thele-,s, h) -
catch mortal ity remarns a concern in RB-managed multi.'>peci~:s f'i:o-herics. 
Vessels hat'·esting multiple nxJ fish species may choo.'>e to dbc.rrd lbh 
caught in excess of permit holding">, and rdati\'e catch le\ els at the :rggreg:rtl' 
len:! may not he aligned with aggregate TAC targets.1" 
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The \\\\' study focused on 1993, the year that the cost survey data are 
antibhle As shown in figure 1.2, depressed dockside prices have persisted 
from 1991 though 2001. Changes in stock abundance and species compo-
-.itJon. and adjustments to the Ti\C of red sn::tpper over time make extrar-
olation of net henellt estimates to other years of thl: controlled access man-
a~emt:nt program difficult. Sti ll , it is reasonable to think that ht:nefits 
'imibr in magniltlde to the I 993 estimates were ava ilahll: throughout 
1991- 2001. 
CONCLUSION 
ll1rs thapter d iscusses the potential long-run economic hendlts of switching 
from controlled access management to a property rights-based management 
program in the northl:rn Gulf of Mexico reef fish fl.sheiy. Spreading the ru l 
-.n~tpper harvest more evenly throughout each year \\'ill elimin::tte rnarkl:t 
gluts and raise average dockside revenues. In 1993 alonl:, it is estimated that 
re\ enue-. could have incrt.>:tsl:d hy $;3.208 million. This is a 18.6 percent in-
cn:a-.e 0\ er 1993 red snapper revenues. Significant han est cost savings, in 
the: range of 7'5 percent of actual costs incurred. could he genl:rated under 
tradable harvest permits. Eliminating per-trip-ca tch limits and seasonal clo-
'ure..,, and rt.>:tllocating harvesting responsibi liti l:s to cost-efficient ' esst:ls 
could have reduced Heel h~m·est costs in 199.3 by R078 million. 
ll1e combined revenue gains and cost s:n·ings that are predicted under 
righb-ha..,ed management are estimated at 11.281 million in 1993. These 
~~un-. arc a\·ailahle only it a system of freely tradabk: harvest permits can be 
designed and implemented. Designing such a program is likely to he com-
plicawd, and implementing such a rrogram may be more difficu lt (Commit-
ke to Re\ iew Individual rishing Quotas 1999; Squires et al. 1998). Thc.:sc.: ob-
'tacle.., -.hould he weighed against the economic benefits of management 
rt>form. "hich appear to ht: large. 
NOTES 
1. On April 2, 2001, the Vl'~Sel \Vt~J'II<.<~ Po/11 sank in bad weather, dgltty-lh c 
mile-. ofT 1\lar~h L-;J;rnd. l. oui~iana. The H.:ssd's captain ~la ted. " I wouldn't have lx.·t·n 
out there: then except the derby \\:I., on" (quo ted in tht: Co11rier lllouma, LAI i\1:1) 12, 
2001). 11lc derh}' refer.. to !he opt::ning of a ten-da) fhhing St'a'>~>n for red :-.nappt•r. 
"luch began on April I. 
2. A more detailed dc<;<:ription of the sludy':-. data ~et. nwth<xlology, and re..,ults 
h t'tmtarncd rn \X'cninger and \X'aters (200:~) . 
.3 for examples, see Casey et al. 0993), Gcen and :t) t:r ( 19HH), and (iatl\ in, 
Ward, :rnd Burges..., 099 D. 
H.2 Q11i1111 II l'llillger Cllld}OIII('S R. \1 {//ers 
1. For detail~. M'C \X'ater-, ( 1996>. 
). fdb. Cox, a p:utidpant in the n~hel)' e-mail, .June .2001. 
6. For a dctaik:d dc~Tiption of thl· co'>l survey de~ign and data, -.cc \X':Her' ( I<)<XJ) 
- ll1i~ a~sumption b con,istcnt '' ith indu~try t(:..:dhach. hut cannot be verifk·d 
from thl· 1995 data. If the a•Ntmption is not cotTet·t, incfflcienq. in the 1995 data \\ill 
be under~tated a~ will he the predicted harvt"~ting eflk ienl} under RIJ managemt·nt 
H. Equilibrium lleet strm:turc under t•~•dahle han e.'>l [)t'rmih and joint production 
b characterized in Squires and Kirkley ( 1996) and Weninger ( 199Hl. 
9. RAC is a multiple-product analog to a\crage hant•.-,ting co,ts l(u· th..: '>ingh: 
output ca-.c and Gtn IX' interpreted ~imilarly in the lollo\\ ing di-,cu~..,ion . 
10. For additional di~U">!>ion , sc..: Anderson ( 19H9>. 
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